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Serious consideration is being given to the merits of privatizing Social
Security. Debate over privatization and the future of Social Security gives
expression to two differing value systems: the community-enhancing val-
ues of the program's defenders versus libertarian values of its critics. This
article examines the implications of the debate. Areas of agreement among
advocates and opponents of privatization are discussed. Special attention
is paid to conflicting views about privatization and to the distributive
implications of proposals to address the program's projected financing
problem. In shifting much risk from government onto individuals, priva-
tization would undermine basic Social Security protections. And it would
complicate the program's financing problems and in the long run weaken
political support. Moreover, many alternative benefit or tax changes can
address the shortfall without weakening the moral basis of Social Security.
The January 1997 report of the 1994-96 Advisory Council
on Social Security kicked-off spirited debate about the future
of Social Security.1 Rather than presenting one Social Security
reform option as in the past, this Council split into three factions,
each with their own set of recommendations. Moreover, for the
first time, the advocates of privatizing the program succeeded
in assuring that serious consideration will be given to privatiza-
tion proposals-an outcome guaranteeing complex and heated
deliberations.
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One proposal would maintain the basic commitments and
structure of Social Security. It calls for a number of minor changes
and serious consideration of one major change, investing forty
percent of the growing Social Security trust fund assets in the
stock market via the equivalent of a passively managed index
fund. The other two proposals call for the partial privatization of
Social Security and the creation of individual IRA-like accounts-
fundamental alterations of the program that guarantee much
controversy. The most radical proposal calls for gradually trans-
forming Social Security into a two tier scheme with the first
tier providing a low flat rate benefit ($410) to all recipients and
the second tier based on diverting payroll tax contributions to
mandatory IRA-like accounts.
To adequately assess the potential consequences of the un-
usual departure of contemporary Social Security policy debate
from the traditional approaches to reform, we believe policymak-
ers, analysts and the general public need to be well-informed
about 1) the origins, goals and benefits of Social Security and 2)
the scope of the existing financing problem, the policy choices
and their consequences.
Social Security: Origins, Goals and Protections
Today, Social Security-the Old-Age Survivors and Disabil-
ity Insurance program (OASDI)-is the central institution in the
American approach to social protection. But it wasn't always this
way. "Prior to the enactment of the Old-Age Insurance Program
in 1935, economic security rested on the ability, discretion, and
goodwill of families, charities, and government officials to sup-
plement individuals' actions" (Kingson and Schulz, 1997, 42).
And the county poor house, now little more than an historical
footnote, stood as the most feared symbol of indigence in old age.
The rapid growth of an industrializing and capitalizing econ-
omy meant that the nation could afford more social protection.
Simultaneously, a changed economy placed more workers at risk
of loss of income due to economic cycles, age-related obsolescence
and disability (Berkowitz, 1991). At the beginning of the 20th
century one group of social reformers, looking to the European
experience, began to advance the social insurance approach to
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economic security. Rejecting the principle of "less eligibility"
arising out of the nation's poor laws traditions-the idea that the
circumstances of relief should be so unpleasant as to discourage
all but the most needy from seeking public benefits-the social
insurance approach sought to provide widespread protection
against risks considered common to industrial societies, namely
income loss due to old age, unemployment, disability, survivor-
ship and health care costs.
Unlike private insurance which protects those who can afford
and choose to purchase coverage, the driving purpose behind
social insurance is to provide broad protection against identifiable
risks across all income groups. Private insurance emphasizes the
principle of "individual equity"-that, all things being equal,
rates of returns to beneficiaries should be proportional to pre-
mium payments. But social insurance-built on the belief that
it is in society's interest to provide a rational means of assisting
citizens to protect themselves and their families against major eco-
nomic risks-emphasizes adequacy, the idea that benefits should
be sufficient to meet basic needs. (By design social insurance re-
turns must vary across income classes and cohorts, providing pro-
portionately larger returns to those at greatest risk while simulta-
neously providing somewhat larger benefits to those paying more
to a social insurance program. Otherwise the social adequacy goal
would not be achieved.) This fundamental difference between
private and social insurance led Reinhart Hohaus, actuary and
Metropolitan Life Insurance executive, to observe in his now
classic 1938 article that social insurance responds to society's need
to provide basic protection for the citizenry:
Hence, just as considerations of equity of benefits form a natural and
vital part of operating private insurance, so should considerations of
adequacy control the pattern of social insurance benefits. Likewise,
as private insurance would collapse if it stressed considerations of
adequacy more than those of equity, so will social insurance fail
to remain undisturbed if considerations of equity are allowed to
predominate over those of adequacy (Hohaus, 1960).
With the exception of the state by state enactment of work-
man's (now called worker's) compensation laws, social insur-
ance programs made little headway during the first third of the
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twentieth century. But in the context of the economic collapse of
the 1930s, the Social Security Act of 1935 was passed. Ironically,
Old-Age Insurance, the program we have come to know as Social
Security, was neither large nor initially very popular as it required
collecting a new payroll tax and did not promise to pay out ben-
efits until the early 1940s. In fact, Social Security did not emerge
as the dominant source of public old age income protection until
passage of the 1950 amendments to the Social Security Act. But
even before that, beginning in 1939 when survivors and selected
dependent protections were added to OAI, a pattern of incremen-
tal expansion of Social Security was established with disability
insurance added in 1956, Medicare in 1965, real benefit increases
in the late 1960s and early 1970s and the cost of living adjustment
in 1972 (Berkowitz, 1991).
This pattern of incremental expansion came to an end in
the mid-1970s as the nation's politics changed and as Social Se-
curity began to face financing problems brought on by short-
term economic downturns in the mid-1970s and early 1980s and
by changing demographics. Financing amendments followed in
1977 and 1983, and today it is once again clear that legislation will
be needed to address a projected shortfall. But for the first time
since the implementation of the program, serious consideration is
being given to proposals to privatize and/or means test OASDI,
approaches which would change the nature of "Social Security as
we know it," departing radically from the principles which have
guided the program since its inception.
Indeed substantial ideological differences bound contempo-
rary Social Security debate. To some on the right, the system's
financing problems provide opportunity to tug at the foundation
of social welfare in the U.S. by framing the projected financing
problem as a cause of budget problems, requiring radical re-
form. This approach is connected to a strategy to deligitmate
the program by advancing the argument that Social Security is
undermining savings and the well-being of future generations.
Moreover, they often argue, Social Security is just one part of a
larger, homogeneous entitlement problem, which includes Med-
icaid, Medicare, Medicaid and other entitlement spending.
Proponents of the existing program generally suggest that
the projected shortfall can be addressed through a reasonable
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combination benefit reductions and/or payroll tax increases. As
for other problems such as population aging and large health
care costs, though viewed as obviously important and related,
proponents suggest they are separate from the OASDI financial
shortfall. Unfortunately, where those advocating radical change
are attaching their arguments to a vision about what is best for the
future, the proponents of social insurance sometimes seem mired
in the technical details of how to address the financing problem
and fail to give sufficient attention to clarifying the values at stake
in the debate. Hence, they often avoid important questions about
the kind of society we wish to be and the role of Social Security
in achieving a positive vision.
As discussions proceed on how best to address the shortfall
and on the advisability of the more radical approaches to reform,
it will be important not to lose sight of Social Security as a practical
ideal which has provided the building block that has transformed
old age. It is the only pension protection available to six out
of ten working persons in the private sector. For those who are
relatively well off, say the roughly 4.8 million elderly households
with incomes between $18,732 and $31,179 in 1994, Social Security
provides nearly half of the total income going to their homes.
For the 60 percent of the elderly households (14.6 million) with
incomes under $18,731 in 1994, Social Security provides over
70 percent of all income (U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 1996). Indeed, absent Social Security, the poverty rate
among the old would increase to roughly 50 percent. And impor-
tantly, the security of beneficiaries is protected by cost-of-living
protection which assures that benefits, once received, maintain
their purchasing power into advanced old age-the point in time
when elderly persons, especially widows, are often at greatest
economic risk.
The program also provides widespread and basic protection
to America's families and employees. It is also the main source
of disability and survivors protections. For a 27 year old couple
with two children under age 2 and with earnings equal to average
wages, it provides the equivalent of a $300,000 life insurance
policy; a $207,000 disability policy; or, looked at another way,
the equivalent of $12.1 trillion dollars in life insurance protection,
more than the entire value ($10.8 trillion) of all the private life
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insurance protection in force. Included among its 44 million ben-
eficiaries are three million children under 18 who receive benefits
each month. In short, a program with an expansive reach, Social
Security has become a central societal institution.
The Financing Problem:
Dimensions, Choices and Consequences
In addition to recognizing the historical and political context
giving rise to Social Security, today's debate about the impli-
cations of the Advisory Council report and the future of Social
Security should recognize:
" We are facing a financing problem, not a crisis
" Privatization does not address the Social Security financing
problem
" Important areas of agreement exist, despite some strong dis-
agreements
* Privatization shifts risks from the government to individuals
" Privatization creates winners and losers
" Many reform options exist
" Conflicting values are at the core of this debate.
The Dimensions of the Financing Problem
While an excellent political strategy for those seeking to shrink
the public sector, the alarmist view that Social Security is going
"belly-up" is wrong on several counts.2 Even if no policy changes
were made, after 2029 anticipated revenues would still be suf-
ficient to meet about three-quarters of the program's promises
according to Social Security's Board of Trustees' Given the na-
tion's 60 year tradition of making periodic adjustments to keep
the system in projected balance seventy-five years into the future,
it is reasonable to assume that some of the roughly 25 percent gap
that remained would be made up by moderate benefit reductions
and'payroll tax increases well in advance of 2029. No doubt this
represents a real financing problem and should be addressed
soon, but the timing and magnitude of the problem hardly calls
for pressing the panic button in 1997.4
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Very importantly, there is nothing about Social Security's fi-
nancing problems that cries out for privatization as a solution. If
anything, privatization proposals complicate program financing
and make the goal of achieving actuarial balance more difficult.
Privatization would require both a large roll-back of the tradi-
tional Social Security benefit package and additional taxes to
establish individual "savings" accounts. If a portion of current
Social Security benefits are diverted to IRA-like private accounts
new revenues must be found to finance Social Security pensions
to all current and many future recipients. For at least the first
several decades privatization would make it more difficult to
finance Social Security.
Areas of Agreement
In spite of the splits in the Council, the members unanimously
agreed that there is a financing problem, that it can be addressed
and that it should be done sooner rather than later. They also
unanimously agreed that some redistribution to low income per-
sons should be maintained in any Social Security program, that
means-testing Social Security is a bad idea, that full COLA protec-
tion is essential to the economic well-being of beneficiaries and
that any "sacrifice in bringing the system into balance should
be widely shared and not borne entirely by current and future
workers and their employers." All three plans improve the rate of
return for future beneficiaries through some form of investment
of the growing Social Security trust fund assets in the private
sector. All three call for increased tax revenues or their equivalent.
All three would continue a mandatory and universal retirement,
disability and survivors program.
Council majorities supported extending coverage to all new
state and local workers; reducing benefits by roughly three per-
cent through a technical change in the benefit formula; taxing
Social Security benefits in roughly the same manner as income
from contributory defined-benefit plans and adjusting the COLA
to reflect the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimate that the Consumer
Price Index over-adjusts for inflation by 0.21 percent. And there
was majority support for a proposal to accelerate the planned
increase in the normal retirement age to 67 in 2011 instead of
2022, and to index it to changes in life expectancy thereafter.
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Taken, together, these five changes address seventy percent of
the projected financing problem-arguably a pretty substantial
down-payment on the projected shortfall.'
Areas of Disagreement
Of course, it is the differences between the plans that are
generating the greatest controversy. The proposal which would
basically maintain the existing structure and commitments of the
present program-the Maintain Benefits plan-is supported by
six of the .13 members of the Council, including Robert Ball, a
former commissioner of Social Security and the labor representa-
tives among others. While this proposal calls for giving strong
consideration to gradually investing 40 percent of trust fund
assets in the stock market via something along the lines of a
passively managed index fund, it does not call for the creation
of individual IRA-like accounts. Because the government bears
the risk, it insulates individuals and their families from poor
investments and market fluctuations. If government investment
in index funds yields a real rate of return of seven percent over
the next 35 years, the Maintain Benefits plan would help ease
the burden of providing for the retirement of the boomers-
significantly decreasing by roughly 35 percent the need to cut
benefits or generate additional federal revenues through tax in-
creases. Of course, if the stock market experiences an extended
period of decline or stagnation, the plan would compound the
problem of paying for the boomers.6
The more moderate of the two partial privatization schemes-
the Individual Account (IA) plan-is supported by two members,
including the Council's chairman, Edward Gramlich, dean of
the University of Michigan's Institute of Public Policy. The IA
plan would establish small defined contribution accounts for
each worker by mandating a new contribution-arguably an
indirect tax increase-of 1.6 percent of covered payroll to indi-
vidual investment accounts. Workers would have a few invest-
ment options, but far fewer than envisioned in the Schieber plan.
The administrative costs of the individual accounts would be
relatively low since the individual accounts would be publicly
managed. Benefit reductions, especially for middle and high-
income workers, would help bring the public portion of the
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revised Social Security program into long run actuarial balance.
"The combination of the reduced growth in benefits, the in-
creased age of eligibility for full retirement benefits, and the
proceeds of the individual accounts would leave total benefits
on average at about the levels of present law for all income
groups."7
The most radical privatization proposal-the Personal Se-
curity Accounts (PSA) plan-calls for a partial privatization of
Social Security and is supported by five members and identified
with Sylvester Schieber, an executive with a benefits consultant
company and Caroline Weaver, an economist at the American
Enterprise Institutes and former advisor to former senator Robert
Dole. It calls for gradually transforming Social Security into a two
tier scheme with the first providing a low flat rate benefit ($410
in today's dollars) and the second tier based on contributions
made to mandatory IRA-like accounts. Additionally, the value
of disability benefits would be reduced and retirement eligibility
ages increased. Five percent of the current payroll tax would be
diverted into these privately-held and managed defined contri-
bution accounts. Those with high earnings and those who make
better investment decisions (or are just plain "lucky") would
end up with larger second tier benefits. This proposal would be
financed by a 72 year "transition" payroll tax of 1.52 percent and
by borrowing $1.9 trillion dollars from general revenues to be
repaid using the projected excess of tax revenues between 2035
to 2075.8
Shifting the Risks: Winners and Losers
Privatization-especially large scale privatization such as that
proposed under the PSA plan-may be a bad idea. But it is not
necessarily so for everyone-at least if we assume that the most
well-off do not have a stake in promoting the well-being of the
rest of society. Affluent workers would likely do better under
privatization plans-at least in so far as they do not experience
serious declines in their earning capacities during middle age.
Such workers would be well provided for even if the stock market
were to stagnate or decline just prior to retirement. But the biggest
winners would be the banks, mutual funds and investment com-
panies who stand to benefit from the millions of transactions and
56 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
trillions in private sector investment that would follow even a
small partial privatization.
It may be economically rational for the affluent to accept the
risks associated with privatization. But not so for most middle
and low-income persons. The primary risks are market risk, in-
vestment risk, inflation risk and political risk.
Privatization places low- and moderate-income workers at
significant political risk. As Social Security is currently structured
low-income workers get a better return than high wage workers
on their contributions,9 a factor that keeps millions of the elderly
out of poverty during their retirement years. With privatization,
upper-middle and high-income wage workers would have less
reason to maintain the purchasing power of the basic benefit
that low-income workers are especially dependent upon. Hence,
in separating out the interests of higher-income workers from
the public portion of the program, privatization schemes ensure
erosion of political support for the program's redistributive role-
an outcome which would further increase the economic and social
distance between rich and poor. Even a modest privatization
scheme such as the IA plan risks the inadvertent undermining
the program's social adequacy goal.
Middle and low income workers would face especially serious
market risks. Long run returns on stock market investments have
generally been quite favorable. But no promises can be made
about what will happen to an individual's nest egg in the few
years, months or even days before retirement.
Low- and even many middle-income workers cannot afford
good investment advice. They are more likely to make poor
investment decisions, for example, investing too conservatively
during early working years or taking unacceptably high risks
just prior to retirement. And after retirement, beneficiaries would
receive much less protection against inflation under the Schieber
plan, yet another example of how privatization plans often shift
risk from government to the individual. The affluent are better
positioned to seek financial advice and tolerate such risks, but
the impact on low and middle income retired persons could end
up being devastating.
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Other Options Exist
When the focus of Social Security reform moves towards
the legislative process, policymakers and the public would be
well advised to look beyond these three plans. Certainly, the
"consensus" recommendations in the Advisory Council report
provide a reasonable basis for starting the policy discussion,
although each should be carefully assessed especially in terms
of their costs and benefits for different population groups. But
other options must be (and are being) considered.
One approach would eliminate the taxable maximum ceiling
for the employer, set at $65,400 in 1997, thereby requiring the
employer to pay the Social Security payroll tax on all wages that
are paid. As the nation's income distribution has become more un-
equal, the proportion of wages covered by the payroll tax dropped
from roughly 90 percent to 88 percent, and it is projected to drop
to 85.5 percent ten years from now. Subjecting 100 percent of the
employer's payroll to FICA taxation would effectively eliminate
almost 1/2 of the projected financing problem. Yet another tax
ceiling approach would restore and maintain the proportion of
wages covered by the payroll tax at the 90 percent level by 2000,
addressing about 14 percent of the projected financing problem.
And there are many other possibilities.
Another set of proposals would reduce the fringe benefits
exemptions from payroll taxation. As fringe benefits have grown,
the proportion of total compensation (cash earnings and fringes)
subject to payroll taxation has shrunk. This represents a very
substantial loss to the trust funds which could be partially offset
by treating some portion of fringes as taxable for Social Security's
purposes. At the extreme, subjecting 90 percent of all cash and
fringe benefit compensation to the payroll tax would address
roughly 45 percent of the projected financing problem.10 Similarly,
Edith Fierst, a member of the Advisory Council, notes that Social
Security's actuaries estimate that taxing "the cost of employer-
provided group health and life insurance... as though it were
cash compensation" would address roughly one-third of the pre-
dicted shortfall." The distributive consequences are progressive
because the burden of this change would fall primarily on higher
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income workers who generally receive relatively and absolutely
larger amounts of their total compensation in the form of non-
taxable fringe benefits. And there are many other reforms on
both the benefit and tax sides of the ledger that could address
Social Securities financing problems without radically altering
the program.
Senator Moynihan accepts the findings from another commis-
sion headed by economist Michael Boskin that the CPI overstates
inflation by much more, perhaps 1 to 1.5 percent. The Boskin
commission suggests that the CPI does not provide an accurate
basis of measuring changes in overall living standards because
it does not account for improvements in quality or the changing
purchasing habits of Americans (e.g., buying in discount stores
and purchasing substitute goods (e.g., oranges) when the price of
another good (e.g., grapefruits) rise.2 Writing in the New York
Times, the Senator calls for a 1.1 percent reduction in annual
COLAs. The advantage-namely a quick and fair fix to roughly
70 percent of the projected deficit-is obvious.
The danger is that a new approach to approximating changes
in the cost of living would understate the effects of inflation for
some vulnerable groups. No one wants to provide a COLA that
increases benefits in excess of price increases. However, there are
serious questions about the type of price index that should be
used. It is important to use an index that adequately and fairly
assesses increases in the cost of living for those living at the
economic margins including such subgroups as very old widows.
It is not enough that an index provides an accurate measure of
increases in the cost of living for the population as a whole. 3
Values at Stake
There is a disturbing tendency to reduce Social Security dis-
cussions to mere accounting exercises of the financial cost of the
program, overlooking its value as a source of national social cohe-
sion and as an expression of the contributions and obligations of
each member of the national community. It has stood as a symbol
of the kinds of programs that the federal government has been
able to do well.
But even many of Social Security's staunchest defenders
have focused on technical changes to the relative neglect of the
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profound debate that is taking place between two very different
value systems: the community-enhancing values of the program's
defenders versus libertarian values of its critics, values that call
for shrinking the size of the government as well as shifting risk
burdens and responsibility from the national community to the
individual. This debate is fundamentally about our sense of re-
sponsibility to each other; about the basic protection that each
working American should be assured of for themselves and their
families in old age, disability or on the death of a loved one;
about the mix of public and private efforts we should encourage
to assure that security. And this debate is also about the real
consequences to the well-being of individuals and families of
various possible changes.
Certainly, all Americans should be encouraged to save. But
in shifting much of the risk from government onto individuals,
privatization would undermine the basic retirement, disability
and life insurance protections of all Americans-an outcome that
would be unfortunate when the economic transformation of the
American economy is rendering employment and living stan-
dards less secure.
Indeed, there is nothing about the current financing problem
of Social Security that requires such radical and unprecedented
change. And there is much to argue for addressing the financing
problems in a way that assures that our children and theirs will
receive basic protections from this program which for sixty years
has served as an expression of the nation's concern for each
member of the national community.
The moral basis of Social Security rests on the assumption
that we, as a people, have a stake in the well-being of our family
and neighbors. Along with Social Security, this value is worth
preserving.
Notes
1. Advisory Council on Social Security (1997).
2. For a presentation of the case for privatizing Social Security, see Michael
Tanner's testimony in U. S. Senate (1995). Also see Beard (1996), Ferrra
(1995), Kotlikoff (1992), Peterson (1996)
3. Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and
Disability Insurance Trust Funds (1997)
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4. See Ball (1997), Myers (1997), Steuerle (1997) and Quinn & Mitchell (1996).
5. See Advisory Council on Social Security (1997).
6. See Advisory Council on Social Security (1997). Also see National Academy
of Social Insurance (1996). Also, it is important to note that under the other
two plans, market declines would translate into lost benefits for millions of
boomers.
7. Advisory Council on Social Security (1997, 28).
8. See Advisory Council on Social Security (1997, 32).
9. Consistent with the social insurance goal of providing a floor of protection
for all Americans, the Social Security benefit formula provides proportion-
ately higher benefits to workers who have worked consistently at lower-
paying jobs. It replaces about 58 percent of average monthly earnings for
persons retiring at age 65 with yearly earnings equal to one-half of average
wages, compared to about 28 percent for workers whose earnings equaled
the maximum subject to payroll taxation. So while higher income workers
receive larger monthly benefits than low and middle income workers, these
monthly benefits replace a smaller proportion of pre-retirement earnings.
10. See Bipartisan Commission on Entitlement and Tax Reform (1995)
11. Fierst (1997, 141).
12. See United States Senate Committee on Finance (1996).
13. See Stewart and Pavalone (1996) for evidence that the current CPI underes-
timates increase in the cost of living for those age 62 and over. The problem
gets worse for the very old. Also see Baker (1996) and Madrick (1997)
for critical assessment of the conclusions reached in United States Senate
Committee on Finance (1996).
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